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A Fugitive Thread: 
The Production of Subjectivity in Marx
JASON READ
If one has the audacity to attempt an analysis of the current conjuncture, 
an analysis  that  is  not  satisfied  to  simply circulate  the watchwords of 
“postmodernism”  and  “globalization,”  but  attempts  to  locate  the  real 
contradictions and tensions animating the present, then such an analysis 
must  start  from  the  intimate  relationship  between  capitalism  and 
subjectivity. Intimate, in the sense that subjectivity and the production of 
subjectivity are no longer (if they ever were) limited to the superstructure, 
to the reproduction of a capable and docile labor force, they have become 
directly  productive  for  capital.  This  can  be  seen in  the  way in  which 
knowledge,  affects,  and  tastes  have  become  incorporated  into  the 
production process.  In contemporary capitalism (it  is difficult  today to 
retain the appellation “late capitalism”) it is not just commodities that are 
produced and consumed but “lifestyles” ways of perceiving, thinking, and 
acting.  It  is  this  new  reality  that  critical  thinking  must  confront  and 
transform. At  first  glance it  would appear that  the  existing theoretical 
tools seem inadequate to the task.  On one side, stemming from Marx, 
there  are  the  tools  for  an  examination  of  the  transformations  and 
development of the capitalist mode of production in which subjectivity 
remains an afterthought or consequence, while on another side, stemming 
from Foucault and poststructuralist  thinkers, there is an examination of 
the production of subjectivity as a “relation to self” which is examined 
apart from the transformation of capitalist valorization (Lazzarato 115). 
In the current conjuncture we find ourselves stranded between these two 
lines  of  investigation  unable  to  grasp  the  transformations  of  politics, 
culture,  and  the  economy by  new intersections  of  production  and  the 
production of subjectivity.
Pli 13 (2002)
One response to this theoretical impasse would be to seek the possible 
grounds  for  an  intersection  of  these  two  theoretical  fields.  There  is 
emerging work in this area that seeks the possible point of articulation 
between the examination of the capitalist  mode of production in Marx 
and the analysis of the production of subjectivity in Foucault and after. 
However, the search for such a relation would on some level presuppose 
what I would like to put into question here. It assumes that each discourse 
contains  what  the  other  lacks,  that  there  may  not  already  be  an 
investigation of the production of subjectivity in Marx, and thus the two 
modes of investigation can be assembled together like pieces of a puzzle. 
Rather  than  attempt  to  reconcile  Marx’s  analysis  of  the  mode  of 
production with the production of subjectivity as if they were necessarily 
two separate unified problems I  would like to  examine the manner in 
which there is already a theory of the production of subjectivity in Marx. 
Marx  does  not  explicitly  develop  this  theory,  rather  it  exists  in  the 
interstices and the points of tension and contact of his concepts. Thus 
such an examination entails reading Marx “against  the grain.” Perhaps 
less  against  the  grain  of  Marx,  but  rather  of  much work  on  Marxism 
which finds in the early works an appeal to a humanist  conception of 
subjectivity  (necessarily  pre-existing  its  later  alienation  in  an  original 
fullness)  and in  the  later  encounters  nothing  but  a  purely  economistic 
exposition of the laws of capitalist development. 
A  reading  for  the  production  of  subjectivity  in  Marx  entails  an 
investigation of not only Marx’s concept of the mode of production but 
the implicit ontology that underlying it, appearing intermittently as a sort 
of “fugitive thread” in Marx’s writings. Perhaps the clearest indication of 
this  ontology  is  given in  the  1857 ‘Introduction’,  otherwise known as 
Notebook M of the  Grundrisse. The immediate critical target of Marx’s 
introduction is the categories of classical political economy, specifically, 
how bourgeois or classical political economy proceeds from a particular 
articulation  of  the  relation  between production,  distribution,  exchange, 
and consumption. Marx writes:
Thus [in political economy] production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption  form  a  regular  syllogism;  production  is  the 
generality,  distribution  and  exchange  the  particularity 
[Besonderheit],  and consumption  the  singularity  [Einzelnheit]  in 
which the whole is joined together. This is admittedly a coherence, 
but  a  shallow one.  Production  is  determined by  general  natural 
laws, distribution by social accident, and the latter may therefore 
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promote production to a greater or lesser extent; exchange stands 
between the two as a formal social movement; and the concluding 
act, consumption, which is conceived not only as a terminal point 
[Endziel] but also as an end-in-itself [Endzweck], actually belongs 
outside of economics except in so far as it reacts in turn upon the 
point  of  departure  and  initiates  the  whole  process  anew.  (1973 
89/25) 
Within  this  conception  of  political  economy,  production  and 
consumption, the starting point and end point of political economy, are 
outside  political  economy,  or,  at  least,  outside  the  history  of  political 
economy. Consumption and production are governed by “natural laws”, 
by  the  anthropological  constants  of  need  and  reproduction.  They  thus 
function  as  the  “given”,  the  assumed  ground  from  which  political 
economy proceeds.  Only distribution  and circulation are recognized as 
properly historical:  there are only different  types of property, different 
forms of  law,  which mediate  without  changing  the  natural  relation  of 
need. The only relation is exchange. The only history is the history of 
different forms of exchange. Classical political economy is determined in 
the  first  and  last  instance  by  an  anthropology  that  is  wise  enough  to 
remain  out  of  sight,  directing  the  action  from  off  stage.196 As  Louis 
Althusser has argued it is not a big step from this silent anthropological 
ground to an entire  anthropomorphic  discourse on the social  in which 
“society” or the “economy” is figured as a closed totality with needs and 
demands. Classical political economy begins from an implicit conception 
of subjectivity, a static anthropology of need and exchange, and from this 
presupposition  it  articulates  an  image  of  society  as  a  unified  subject. 
Marx’s opposition to this  second point  is  well  known, where classical 
political  economy sees a unified society,  a population,  Marx finds the 
differences and antagonisms of class struggle.  What is less apparent is 
that  Marx  also  opposed  the  implicit  ground  of  classical  political 
economy, developing an anthropology that  does not  tie  subjectivity  to 
ahistorical  coordinates  of  need  and  scarcity,  but  posits  subjectivity  as 
both produced and productive. 
196 Althusser argues that this “anthropology” remains out of sight in and through the 
manner in which classical economy assumes “need” as a necessarily pre-conceptual 
given which delineates the field of political economy, political economy is concerned 
with material need. Thus this anthropology is at the same time a moral ideology – 
what it excludes by definition is the determination of the economy by other factors 
such  as  power  or  domination.  There  is  by  definition  only  production  for  need. 
(Althusser and Balibar 162/368) 
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For  Marx  the  terms  of  classical  political  economy,  production, 
consumption, and distribution, and the relations these terms describe must 
be understood as historical. Or, put differently, rather than maintaining 
the simple and linear causality of natural needs and historical mediations, 
Marx  develops  a  thought  of  the  complex  relations  of  production, 
distribution,  exchange,  and  consumption  in  which  all  act  upon  and 
determine each other,  and to  a  certain  extent,  produce each other.  To 
translate  this  into  another  philosophical  language,  the  interrelations  of 
production,  consumption,  and  distribution  could  be  considered  as  the 
exposition of a thought of immanence, in that it is opposed to both the 
theoretical  assertion  of  a  transcendental  scene  of  determination  that 
remains  exterior  to  that  which  it  determines  (as  in  most  forms  of 
economism) or the assumption of a concealed transcendental foundation 
(as in the anthropological ground of classical economics).197 A thought of 
immanence requires that all of the relations (production, distribution, and 
consumption) must be thought both as effect and cause of each other. The 
simultaneity of a relation of cause and effect can be demonstrated with 
respect  to  production  and  consumption.  Marx  demonstrates  that 
production and consumption seem to have an immediate identity as well 
as  a  contrariety,  in  the  simple  fact  that  all  production  involves 
consumption  of  raw  materials  and  at  the  same  time  all  consumption 
seems  to  immediately  produce  something,  if  only  the  energy  for 
production. Beyond this immediate identity Marx asserts that there is a 
more intimate relation of co-implication that encompasses and enfolds the 
supposed exterior and ahistorical ground of need and subjectivity. 
Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it  also 
supplies a need for the material. As soon as consumption emerges 
from its initial state of natural crudity and immediacy – and, if it 
197Althusser  argues  that  Marx’s  entire  mature  philosophy  entails  a  rethinking  of 
causality, and the development of a thought of “immanent causality”, which breaks 
down the rigid hierarchy between cause and effect.  The supposed “effects” of the 
capitalist  mode  of  production,  such  as  greed  and  ideologies  of  possession  and 
property,  must  be  equally  thought  as  causes,  elements  of  its  functioning.  “This 
implies therefore that the effects are not outside the structure, are not a pre-existing 
object,  element or space in which the structure arrives to  imprint its mark:  on the 
contrary, it implies that the structure is immanent in its effects, a cause immanent in 
its effects in the Spinozist sense of the term, that the whole existence of the structure  
consists  of  its  effects,  in  short  that  the  structure,  which  is  merely  a  specific 
combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects” (Althusser and 
Balibar 191/405). 
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remained at that stage, this would be because production itself had 
been arrested there – it becomes itself mediated as a drive by the 
object. The need which consumption feels for the object is created 
by the perception of it. The object of art – like every other product 
–  creates  a  public  which  is  sensitive  to  art  and  enjoys  beauty. 
Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also 
a  subject  for  the  object  … Consumption  likewise  produces  the 
producers  inclination by beckoning to him as an aim determining 
need (“Grundrisse” 92/27).
Production produces consumption, producing not only its object but its 
particular mode and subject, and in turn consumption acts on production, 
in effect producing it.198 Similarly, Marx explains: “consumption ideally 
posits the object of production as an internal image, as a need, as a drive 
and a purpose. It  creates the objects of production in a still  subjective 
form” (1973 92/27). 
The mutual relations of causality between production, consumption, 
and  distribution,  are  supported  by  another  larger  sense  of  production, 
which is no longer simply economic production, but is the assertion that 
these different practices cannot but have effects on one another, effects 
that exceed anything that can be measured on the level of the economy. 
According to Marx: “Production predominates not only over itself, in the 
antithetical  definition  of  production,  but  over  the  other  moments  as 
well….A  definite  [bestimmte]  production  thus  determines  a  definite 
consumption,  distribution  and  exchange  as  well  as  definite  relations  
between these different moments.  Admittedly, however, in its  one sided 
form,  production  is  itself  determined  by  the  other  moments”  (1973 
99/34).  This  relation  between  a  determinant  production,  consumption, 
and distribution, serves as one definition given by Marx of a “mode of 
production”; it  does not posit  subjectivity as an external element to be 
“fooled” or interpellated by ideology, but recognizes it as an immanent 
and constitutive dimension of the mode of production. For Marx it is the 
recognition of the implication of subjectivity in the mode of production, 
its  historical  status  as  something both produced and productive  of  the 
mode of production,  which in part differentiates the critical materialist 
account of the economy from classical economics.  “The production of 
capitalists  and  wage  laborers  is  thus  a  chief  product  of  capital’s 
198 Gilles  Deleuze and Félix Guattari  cite,  albeit  obliquely,  Marx’s introduction in 
developing their account of the immanent relation of subjectivity, specifically desire, 
to the mode of production  (1983 4/10) 
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realization process. Ordinary economics, which looks only at the things 
produced, forgets this completely”. (1973 512) Production is always the 
production of subjects as much as it is the production of objects. 
If one wanted to think in terms of “breaks” then it would be possible 
to say that Marx breaks with what would later  become the two major 
spectres  of  Marxist  thought,  “economism”  and  “humanism”  with  one 
term  –  production.  As  Marx  wrote  in  the  sixth  of  the  Theses  on 
Feuerbach:  “…the  human  essence  is  no  abstraction  inherent  in  each 
single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations”. 
While this  statement has been interpreted as  constituting a break with 
humanism,  replacing  the  assertion  of  an  abstract  essence  with  the 
historicity of social relations, it could also be interpreted as an indicator 
pointing  towards  Marx’s  ontological  conception  of  production. 
Production is not an activity restricted to the realm of the economy, nor is 
it simply an anthropological necessity, it is affirmation that existence is 
relational,  there are not abstract essences only the multiple effects, the 
changing ensembles, of different practices. Production is immanence. It is 
not only the assertion that there is no other world than this one, but the 
recognition that this world is constantly being made and remade from a 
multiplicity of different relations. An immanent conception of production 
cannot differentiate in advance between the production of things and the 
production  of  subjectivity,  ascribing  to  each  an  a  priori role  as 
determining and determined, but must be open to their different historical 
articulations. 
In the Introduction Marx seems oddly contemporary, seeming to take 
into  account  not  only  the  philosophical  problem of  the  production  of 
subjectivity, but the related social and political problem of the creation of 
needs and desires  through consumption  and marketing.  As with  many 
points  in  the  Grundrisse,  the  reader  is  struck  by  the  almost  prophetic 
nature of Marx’s writing. It remains difficult, however, to relate Marx’s 
insistence  on  immanence  in  the  introduction  with  his  other  mature 
writings, which seem to focus on a more limited sense of production, the 
production  of  things,  at  the  expense of  the  more thorough account  of 
production that includes the production of social  relations.  Despite the 
fact that Marx did not publish the “1857 Introduction” because it seemed 
to anticipate his research, with respect to the problem of the production of 
subjectivity.  The  “Introduction”  stands  as  more  of  a  provocation  for 
future inquiry, than a result.199 The question then becomes a search for 
199 Marx’s  stated  reasons  for  not  publishing  the  introduction  were as  follows:  “A 
general introduction, which I had drafted, is omitted, since on further consideration it 
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elements of this thought of immanence, or the materiality of subjectivity, 
in Marx’s other writings. 
The  immanent  relation  between  production  and  the  production  of 
subjectivity  announces  itself  most  forcefully  at  the  points  in  Marx’s 
writing where he deals with the problem of the transition from one mode 
of  production  to  another.  At  these  points  of  historical  transformation, 
where one mode of production is destroyed and another is constituted, 
Marx  underscores  that  such  a  transformation  is  impossible  without  a 
corresponding  transformation  of  subjectivity.  This  can  be  seen  in  the 
chapters of Capital where Marx discusses the origin and the formation of 
the capitalist mode of production. The search for the origins of capitalist 
accumulation seems to lead to an infinite regress, always presupposing its 
two  constitutive  conditions:  wealth  freed  from  its  investment  in  any 
particular  endeavor,  or  capital,  and  individuals  with  only  their  labor 
power to sell, or workers. In order to accumulate capital it is necessary to 
possess capital. There must then be an original or primitive accumulation, 
an  accumulation  which  is  not  the  result  of  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production but rather its precondition, and which separates the workers 
from the conditions of employment and stockpiles wealth. Marx’s theory 
of primitive accumulation is an argument which is both historically and 
theoretically dense – dealing with both the history of capitalism in Europe 
and  the  relation  between  violence,  law,  and  the  economy.  For  our 
purposes we can isolate three moments of primitive accumulation: first, 
expropriation,  the  destruction  of  the  commonly  held  lands,  second, 
bloody  legislation,  laws  which  punish  and  control  the  disappropriated 
peasantry,  and  third,  a  period  of  normalization  in  which  the  previous 
moment of violence is eclipsed in the “naturalization” of a new mode of 
production.200 At each point in the process the economic transformation is 
seems to me confusing to anticipate results which still have to be substantiated, and 
the reader who really wishes to follow me will have to decide to advance from the 
particular to the general.” (1970 13) 
200 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have related Marx’s theory to a particular type of 
violence  which  is  difficult  to  critique  because  it  is  always  presented  as  pre-
accomplished and carrying its justification. Deleuze and Guattari write: “Hence the 
very particular character of state violence: it is very difficult to pinpoint this violence 
because it always presents itself as pre-accomplished. It is not even adequate to say 
that the violence rests with the mode of production. Marx made the observation in the 
case  of  capitalism:  there  is  a  violence  that  necessarily  operates  through the  state, 
precedes the capitalist mode of production, constitutes the “primitive accumulation” 
and makes possible the capitalist mode of production itself. From a standpoint within 
the capitalist mode of production, it is very difficult to say who is the thief and who is 
the victim, or even where the violence resides. That is because the worker is born 
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caused  by  and  effects  a  transformation  of  social  relations  and 
subjectivity.201 What is destroyed in primitive accumulation is not simply 
possessions  or  relations  to  the  land  but  a  social  relation  and  form of 
cooperation.  It  is with respect to the final  moment, normalization, that 
subjectivity  fully  comes into  play.  In  order  for  the  capitalist  mode of 
production to constitute itself as a social order it must inscribe itself in the 
habits, desires, and fears of the newly formed working class (Albiac 13). 
As  Marx  writes:  “The  advance  of  capitalist  production  develops  a 
working  class  which  by  education  [Erziehung],  tradition,  and  habit 
[Gewohneit] looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as 
self evident natural laws” (1977 899/765). 
The peasants, farmers, and small craftsmen that are cast out from their 
conditions of existence are not already workers, subjects of labor-power. 
In fact, Marx reminds us that historically they were more likely to resort 
to theft  and vagabondage (1973 736).  This  is  why it  is  insufficient  to 
simply separate the peasants and artisans from the means of production. 
In order for them to become workers, bearers of a force and power that is 
exchangeable and calculable, an entire series of apparatuses must be put 
to  work,  educating,  training,  and  breeding  a  man  that  can  be  made 
productive. Along with the accumulation of wealth and the breakdown of 
feudal or guild relations there is a necessary subjective dimension of the 
constitution of the capitalist mode of production – it requires a subject not 
only  trained  to  the  rhythms  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  but 
whose  desires  and  needs  are  also  attuned  to  its  particular  regime  of 
accumulation.202 To juxtapose Marx’s chapter on primitive accumulation, 
entirely naked and the capitalist  objectively “clothed” an independent owner. That 
which gave the worker and the capitalist this form eludes us because it operated in 
other modes of production. (1987, 447/558) 
201It  is important  to note that we are not dealing with a process in any linear  and 
teleogical sense, primitive accumulation is a series of events that have fundamentally 
different  motivations  and effects,  they can  only  be  pieced  together  in  a  narrative 
retroactively. For example: the laws that destroyed the commons did not have as their 
intention the creation of an urban proletariat, this was simply an unintended effect that 
was later  seized by other  agents  and actors.  Louis Althusser  calls  this  process  by 
which the effects of a particular process are seized and turned to other purpose and 
other ends  détournement,  or “detouring”: “This “detouring” is the mark of the non-
teleology  of  the  process  and  the  inscription  of  its  result  in  a  process  which  has 
rendered  it  possible  and  which  was  totally  alien  to  it.”  (Althusser  1994 572,  my 
transl.)
202 Marx asserts that the condition of these new desires and necessities on the part of 
the worker is the money form, or a particular aspect of the money form the wage: “It 
is the worker himself who converts the money into whatever use-values he desires; it 
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which  ends  the  first  volume  of  Capital,  with  Marx’s  writing  on  the 
commodity,  which opens it,  we see that  the former puts  into question 
what  the  latter  seems  to  presuppose:  the  commodification  of  labor.203 
Labor power does not  always already exist,  ready to be commodified, 
rather its exploitation entails the destruction and creation of a form of 
social cooperation and subjectivity. 
Marx’s  notebook  “Pre-capitalist  Economic  Formations”  in  the 
Grundrisse  offer  something  of  a  general,  albeit  abstract  and  at  times 
vague, theoretical schema of the interrelation of the mode of production 
and the production of subjectivity. Marx presents the immanence of the 
production of subjectivity to the mode of production through a genealogy 
of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production.  Here,  as  with  primitive 
accumulation, Marx is primarily concerned with the formation of the two 
constitutive  elements  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production,  a  flow  of 
wealth and a flow of individuals who have only their labor power to sell, 
and it is the latter of these two elements which is the central concern. 
However, “Pre-capitalist Economic Formations” crosses the same terrain 
as primitive accumulation with one important difference: while the latter 
gives only a negative definition of the bonds which make up pre-capitalist 
sociality by presenting the violence necessary to destroy them, the former 
attempts to present a positive definition of pre-capitalist sociality. It does 
so within a general discussion of the “mode of production,” thus reading 
this  notebook  one  is  confronted  with  both  a  profound  difference  (an 
is he who buys commodities as he wishes and, as the owner of money, as the buyer of 
goods, he stands in precisely the same relationship to the seller of goods as any other 
buyer. Of course, the conditions his existence--and the limited amount of money he 
can earn--compel him to make his purchases from a fairly restricted section of goods. 
But  some variation  is  possible  as  we  can  see  from the  fact  that  newspapers,  for 
example, form part of the essential purchases of the urban English worker. He can 
save or hoard a little. Or else he can squander his money on drink. But even so he acts 
as a free agent; he must pay his own way; he is responsible to himself for the he 
spends his wages.” (1977 1033/103) 
203As Althusser  writes:  “When you  read Section 1 Book 1 of  Capital,  you  find a 
theoretical presentation of surplus value: it is an arithmetical presentation, in which 
surplus  value  is  calculable,  defined  by  a  difference  (in  value)  between  the  value 
produced by labor power on the one hand and the value of the commodities necessary 
for the reproduction of this labor power (wages) on the other. And in this arithmetical 
presentation of surplus value, labor figures purely and simply as a commodity. (1979 
233)  As  Althusser  argues  in  a  different  text  this  purely  quantitative  and  abstract 
presentation of exploitation misses the concrete power and social relations necessary 
to the extraction of value, struggle proceeds from these relations. (1994 398) 
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epochal  divide  separating  pre-capitalist  modes  of  production  from 
capitalism) and a kernel of a general theory.204 
For Marx the specifically pre-capitalist modes of production (Asiatic, 
Ancient,  and Feudal)  are necessarily  conservative in that they have as 
their specific goal the reproduction of a particular form of property and a 
particular  social  relation.  Reproduction  of  a  social  relation  is  also 
reproduction of a particular form of subjectivity. What characterizes the 
different pre-capitalist modes of production is not just their intrinsically 
conservative nature, but the fact that subjectivity is inseparable from its 
collective  and  inorganic  conditions.  The  subject  is  not  exposed  to 
whatever existence he or she can get exchange in his or her labor power 
but is embedded in cultural, technical and political conditions that he or 
she works to reproduce. In the various pre-capitalist modes of production 
these conditions are “naturalized”: that is, they appear to be given, to be 
the preconditions and not the results of labor. Marx compares this relation 
to  these  conditions  to  the  relation  to  the  earth,  as  the  divinely  given 
condition of existence and labor, they constitute the “inorganic body” of 
labor, an intimate exteriority, outside of the subject but necessary to it.205 
Marx is not simply content, however, to wax nostalgically about some 
sort of “primitive communism.” It is not just the earth or the tribe that 
appears  to  be the  precondition  of  one’s  existence  but  also  the  Asiatic 
despot.206 In the Asiatic mode of production the despot appears to be the 
204 Antonio  Negri  suggests  that  Marx’s  use  of  the  term  “mode  of  production” 
encompasses  both  a  world  historical  sense,  the  passage  from  the  Asiatic  to  the 
capitalist  mode  of  production,  developed  most  strongly  in  the  notebook  on  pre-
capitalist  economic  formations,  and  a  on  smaller  scale,  the  transformation  of  the 
technological and social conditions of labor from handicrafts to large scale industry, 
analyzed  in  Capital.  (Negri  151)  In  “Pre-capitalist  Economic  Formations”  we are 
clearly dealing with this second larger sense, which is not only “world-historical” but 
encompasses  the  relation  between  what  is  generally  called  “base”  and 
“superstructure” tending towards a materialist definition of culture. (Althusser 1995 
45)
205 “These natural conditions of existence, to which he relates as to his own inorganic 
body, are themselves double: (1) of a subjective and (2) of an objective nature. He 
finds himself a member of a family, clan, tribe, etc.—which then, in a historic process 
of intermixture and antithesis with others, takes on a different shape; and as such a 
member, he relates to a specific nature (say, here, still earth, land, soil) as his own 
inorganic  being,  as  a  condition  of  his  production  and  reproduction”  (Marx  1973 
490/398). 
206 As Deleuze and Guattari write: “…the forms of social production, like those of 
desiring production, involve an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of 
anti-production coupled with the process, a full body that functions as a socius. This 
socius may be the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or capital. This is the body that 
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precondition of the community, of its works and existence. Each of the 
pre-capitalist  modes  of  production  is  constituted  by  a  fundamental 
misrecognition, what is produced by the labor of the community appears 
as its precondition, as an element of divine authority. 
This  misrecognition  might  seem to  be  a  particular  quality  of  pre-
capitalist  societies,  or  rather  a  particular  quality  of  Marx’s  nineteenth 
century  perspective  on  these  societies.  However,  Marx  also  posits  a 
fundamental  misrecognition  at  the  core  of  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production. In capital it appears that capital produces and circulates by 
itself,  seeming  to  be  prior  to  and  autonomous  from  the  collective 
activities  of  labor.  In  short,  money  appears  to  beget  money.  This 
appearance,  this  mystification,  increases  with  the  development  of  the 
capitalist  mode  of  production.  The  more  capitalism puts  to  work  the 
collective and social powers of labor in the form of science, knowledge, 
and machinery, the more capital itself appears to be productive. This then 
constitutes  the  link  between  capitalism  and  ancient  despotism.  “The 
power of Asiatic and Egyptian kings, of Etruscan theocrats, etc. has in 
modern society been transferred to the capitalist, whether he appears as 
an  isolated  individual  or,  as  in  the  case  of  joint  stock  companies,  in 
combination  with  others”  (Marx  1977  452/353).  Marx  is  not  merely 
positing a rhetorical or polemical identity between capitalism and ancient 
despotism, locating ancient tyrannies at the heart of modernity. Rather, 
Marx is arguing that in both cases there is a social and subjective surplus 
of labor. It is this surplus that is mystified, appearing to be part of the 
despot or capital. Whereas in ancient societies this surplus is produced by 
slavery,  in  modern  society  it  is  produced  by  the  development  of  the 
cooperative powers of labor. In each case there is a dimension of labor 
that  exceeds  any  economic  calculation.  This  excessive  dimension  is 
cooperation, collectivity itself, the simple fact that a group of individuals 
working together will always be capable of more than the sum of its parts. 
Capital pays for workers one by one but when it puts them to work it puts 
knowledges, observations, and even rivalries of a collectivity to work.207 
Marx is referring to when he says that it is not the product of labor, but rather appears 
as its natural or divine presuppositions. In fact, it  does not restrict itself merely to 
opposing productive forces in and of themselves. It falls back on [il se rabat sur] all 
production, constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are 
distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to 
itself both the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it 
as a quasi-cause”. (1983 10/16)
207 Whether  the  combined  working  day,  in  a  given  case,  acquires  this  increased 
productivity because it heightens the mechanical force of labor, or extends its sphere 
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We could say that this incalculable surplus of collectivity constitutes a 
kind  of  hyper-exploitation,  but  that  would  presuppose  a  collectivity 
existing prior to exploitation.  In the formation of capital the collective 
itself is constituted in the act of exploitation. 
Marx’s notebooks on “Pre-capitalist  Economic Formations” provide 
not  so  much  a  schema,  but  a  sketch  of  the  relationship  between 
subjectivity and the mode of production. First,  it places subjectivity as 
entirely immanent to the mode of production, it is as much a part of the 
mode of production as its technical component. Second, it demonstrates 
that  the  relationship  between subjectivity  and the mode of  production 
necessarily entails a dimension of subjection. Subjection for Marx always 
stems from a misrecognition of power and activity. In the Asiatic and 
feudal  mode  of  production  (as  in  capital)  something  produced  and 
contingent, the despot or the feudal order, appears not to be produced at 
all but as the necessary condition for all production. In each case it is not 
simply  a  matter  of  a  perceptual  slippage  between  the  necessary  and 
contingent,  or the productive and no productive;  first  because,  as with 
Marx’s famous commodity fetishism, these are not mere appearances but 
illusions inscribed in the heart of things. More importantly, in each case, 
the misrecognition relates to the presentation of a collective changing and 
creative power, which is presented as an attribute of a sovereign subject 
(despotism) or of things (capitalism).208 Finally, “Pre-capitalist Economic 
Formations” lays out the fundamental tensions and contradictions that can 
cause the transformation from one mode of production to another. These 
tensions can at the root be described as either the contradiction between 
an unpresentable collective sociality and any figure or instance that would 
appropriate that power, or, following the terminology Marx uses in the 
of action over a greater space, or contracts the field of production relatively to the 
scale of production, or at the critical moment sets large masses of labor to work, or 
excited rivalry between individuals and raises their animal spirits, or impresses on the 
similar operations carried on by a number of men the stamp of continuity and many-
sidedness, or performs different operations simultaneously, or economizes the means 
of production by use in common…whichever of these is the cause of the increase, the 
special productive power of the combined working day, is under all circumstances, 
the social productive power of labor, or the productive power of social labor. This 
power arises from cooperation itself. When the worker co-operates in a planned way 
with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities 
of this species [Gattungsvermögen]. (Marx 1977 447/349). 
208 As I have already noted Deleuze and Guattari have taken this sketch from Marx the 
farthest  in  developing  a  general  theory  of  subjectivity/mode  of  production.  For 
Deleuze  and  Guattari  the  name  of  this  collective  fugitive  power  is  “desiring 
production” which is strictly speaking unrepresentable. 
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notebooks, as the contradiction between the reproduction of a mode of 
production and the productive excess that exceeds that reproduction. This 
is only a sketch as the actual dynamics and relations have to be thought 
from the material singularity of a given mode of production.
Despite  any similarity  between Asiatic despotism and the capitalist 
mode of production there is a fundamental difference of “the production 
of subjectivity”. Pre-capitalist modes of production have as their goal the 
reproduction  of  a  particular  form  of  collective  existence  with  its 
corresponding  hierarchies,  structures  of  belief,  and  practices.  As  such 
they  are  vulnerable  to  anything  that  would  break  up  the  codes  of 
subjective  existence,  they  are  equally  threatened  by  anything  that 
challenges  the  subjective  conditions  for  reproduction  as  the  objective 
conditions.  For  example,  war  destabilizes  both  the  economic  and 
subjective  conditions  of  the  ancient  mode of  production  redistributing 
property,  honors,  and  claims  for  citizenship.  Marx’s  “Pre-capitalist 
Economic Formations”  presents  a  genealogy of  the  capitalist  mode of 
production  that  is  simultaneously  a  narrative  of  the  generation  and 
corruption  of  the  different  forms  of  subjectivity.  Capitalism  is 
fundamentally different in that production is no longer subordinated to 
the  reproduction  of  systems of  belief.  As Marx contends,  beneath  the 
limited bourgeois  form,  the  subordination  of  all  productive  activity  to 
capitalist valorization, capital is nothing other than the unfettered forces 
of production, including certainly, the production of subjectivity. 
Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of 
production,  regardless  of  his limited national,  religious,  political 
character, seems to me to be lofty when contrasted to the modern 
world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth 
as  the  aim  of  production.  In  fact,  however,  when  the  limited 
bourgeois  form is  stripped  away,  what  is  wealth  other  than  the 
universality  of  human  needs,  capacities,  pleasures,  productive 
forces  etc.,  created  through  universal  exchange?  The  full 
development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of 
so-called nature as well as humanity’s own nature? The absolute 
working out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition 
other  than  the  previous  historical  development  …  Where 
[humanity]  does  not  reproduce  [her]self  in  one  specificity,  but 
produces her totality? Strives not to remain something [s]he has 
become,  but  is  in  the  absolute  movement  of  becoming?  In 
bourgeois economics-and in the epoch of production to which it 
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corresponds-this  complete  working-out  of  the  human  content 
appears as a complete emptying out, this universal objectification 
as total alienation, and the tearing down of all limited, one-sided 
aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external 
end (Marx 1973 488/396).
Capitalism constitutes and is constituted by a revolution at the level of 
subjectivity.  However, it  would be wrong to identify capitalism with a 
completely  deterritorialized  flow  of  production,  it  must  subject  this 
productive  activity  to  the  demands  of  surplus  value.  “Capitalism  can 
proceed only by developing the subjective essence of abstract wealth or 
production for the sake of production…but…at the same time it can do so 
only in the framework of its own limited purpose, as a determinate mode 
of  production…the  self  expansion  of  existing  capital”  (Deleuze  and 
Guattari  1983 259/308).  The  capitalist  mode  of  production  has  at  its 
foundation  a  collective  subjectivity  unhinged  from  any  determinate 
coding of subjectivity – it is this collective power that the capitalist mode 
of production must simultaneously produce and contain. 
The doubled edge relationship that the capitalist mode of production 
has  with  subjectivity  can  be  found  in  the  genesis  of  Marx’s 
conceptualization  of  labor.  Mario  Tronti  has  argued  that  Marx’s 
development of the concept of abstract labor, or of the relation between 
abstract labor and concrete labor, can be understood as the convergence 
of  problematics  inherited  in  part  from political  economy,  specifically 
Ricardo, on one side, and Hegel on the other (Tronti 156). From Ricardo, 
Marx receives the problem of the relationship between value and abstract 
subjective activity, where value is no longer linked to either a specific 
object or a determinant type of labor, but to abstract or generic activity.209 
While from Hegel, Marx inherits the problem of “abstract labor,” in order 
for labor to constitute a measure, to be exchanged, it must be standardized 
209 This observation is made by Foucault in  The Order of Things  (254). Foucault’s 
argument  in  this  text  is  to  deny  that  Marx  constitutes  any  sort  of  break 
(epistemological  or  otherwise)  with  the  problems  and  presuppositions  of  political 
economy. In contrast to this argument Deleuze and Guattari turn to the same problem, 
the connection between subjectivity and value, in order to find in Marx a recognition 
of the fact that the problem of capital is the problem of subjectivity. As Deleuze and 
Guattari write: “Marx said that Luther’s merit was to have determined the essence of 
religion, no longer on the side of the object,  but as an interior religiosity;  that the 
merit of Adam Smith and Ricardo was to have determined the essence or nature of 
wealth  no  longer  as  an  objective  nature  but  as  an  abstract  and  deterritorialized 
subjective essence, the activity of production in general” (1983 270/322). 
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and rendered equivalent. Whereas for Hegel this standardization was part 
of the actualization of the universal, a moment of cultural Bildung, for 
Marx it is a necessary moment in the constitution of the capitalist mode 
of production. The coexistence of these two problems imposes on Marx’s 
thought a demand which is alien to Ricardo and Hegel: the demand to 
consider the coexistence of an abstract subjective force (labor-power) that 
is extremely powerful, productive of the realm of value, and the necessary 
discipline and control of that force (capital). This combination of Ricardo 
and Hegel in Marx can be understood to entail the same political problem 
that for Foucault underlies disciplinary power: “Discipline increases the 
forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these 
same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (1977 138/139).  In both 
cases  the  political  problem  is  not  simply  one  of  exploitation  or 
domination, but of the necessary provocation of a “counter-power”.
This problem manifests itself in Marx’s writing as the tension between 
“abstract labor” and “living labor.” Of the two of these concepts only the 
first  is directly given in Marx, the second persists as a fugitive thread 
(like the problem of subjectivity itself) throughout Marx’s writing. At the 
outset “abstract labor” refers to the abstraction necessary to quantify the 
activity  of  diverse  bodies.  In  order  for  commodities  to  be  exchanged, 
labor  must  be  organized  so  that  it  is  indifferent  to  who  performs  it. 
Underlying the concept of abstract labor are practices such as surveillance 
and  the  division  and  simplification  of  tasks,  all  of  which  make  this 
indifference  a  material  reality.  The  concept  of  “abstract  labor”  is 
inseparable from a political and economic strategy—the reduction of all 
labor to simple abstract labor, and the destruction of skills. Abstract labor 
is a reduction of the worker, of subjectivity, to the minimum required for 
the reproduction of the capitalist system. This strategy, sometimes called 
“proletarianization,”  which  Marx  at  times  identified  as  the  dominant 
tendency if not the destiny of capitalism, runs up against certain limits, 
not the least of which is “living labor” as the internal limit of abstract 
labor. Living labor is the inverse of abstract labor, it can be described by 
the same attributes – indifference to the content of activity, flexibility, 
even poverty – but these qualities now appear as sources of its strength. 
This living labor, existing as an abstraction from these moments of 
its actual reality [raw-material, instrument of labor etc.] also, not 
value;  this  complete  denudation,  purely  subjective  existence  of 
labor,  stripped  of  all  objectivity.  Labor  as  absolute  poverty; 
poverty  not  as  shortage,  but  as  total  exclusion  of  objective 
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wealth…Labor not as an object, but as activity; not as itself value, 
but  as  the  living  source  of  value….  Thus,  it  is  not  at  all 
contradictory, or, rather, the in-every-way mutually contradictory 
statements that labor is absolute poverty as object, on one side, and 
is,  on  the  other  side,  the  general  possibility  [allgemeine 
Möglichkeit] of wealth as subject and as activity, are reciprocally 
determined  and  follow from the  essence  of  labor,  such  as  it  is 
presupposed by capital as its contradiction and as its contradictory 
being [gegensätzliches Dasein], and such as it, in turn, presupposes 
capital (Marx 1973 296/217). 
Living  labor,  however,  is  not  just  the  abstract  and static  inversion  to 
abstract labor, it appears throughout Marx’s writings at every point that 
capital  necessarily  develops  and  relies  on  the  subjective  capacities  of 
labor,  its  ability  to  not  only  produce wealth,  but  to  communicate and 
constitute new social relations. Living labor is the fact that labor power 
cannot be simply reduced to a functional element of the system. 
The  capitalist  mode of  production  emerges  when  a  flow of  “free” 
labor meets a flow of “free” wealth. It is clear now that this freedom on 
the  side  of  labor  is  the  simultaneity  of  poverty  and  indeterminacy.  It 
would not be improper to think of this indeterminacy, this abstraction, as 
a kind of power, the power to bring the new into the world; after all it 
produces  not  only  things,  commodities,  but  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production  itself.  It  would  also  be  correct  to  identify  this  abstract 
subjective  potential  as  something  new,  and  thus  as  something  which 
emerges with, and is the condition for, capitalist accumulation. It would 
be incorrect, however, to identify this with freedom in the conventional 
sense,  since  this  abstract-subjective-potential  cannot  but  sell  itself  as 
labor power. It must subject itself to whatever-capitalist enterprise, to the 
job and task  available.  Abstract  labor is  free to  develop and consume 
“whatever” forces and possibilities, forces and possibilities unimaginable 
and  impossible  within  the  relatively  narrow  spheres  of  pre-capitalist 
reproduction. At the same time, it is also freely exposed to the demands 
and transformations of the labor market. The old guarantees that limited 
production, tying it to a determinate sphere of reproduction, political and 
social,  have  disappeared.  In  the  absence  of  old  guarantees  and  prior 
limitations, there is a new struggle, a new antagonism: it is a struggle that 
seeks to reduce “living labor”, the flexibility and productivity of a new 
subject,  to “abstract  labor”,  to interchangeability, homogeneity, and an 
increasingly precarious position. 
140
Jason Read
Returning to the current conditions of late capitalism, we recognize 
the simultaneity of these two processes in a world in which, on the one 
hand, the cooperative, intellectual,  and affective capacities of labor are 
continually  developed  and  presupposed,  while,  on  the  other,  this 
flexibility is continually exposed to the precariousness of temp-work and 
part  time  labor.  Viewed  in  light  of  Marx’s  writings  on  primitive 
accumulation and “Pre-capitalist Economic Formations,” we can see how 
capital  redeploys  old  strategies  and  practices  to  contain  the  explosive 
force  of  this  contradiction—capitalism  truly  is  “a  motley  painting  of 
everything  that  has  ever  been  believed”  (Deleuze  and  Guattari  1983 
34/42).  We  are  confronted  with  a  neo-primitive  accumulation,  an 
accumulation  not  simply  of  wealth  and  workers  but  of  subjective 
potentials, desires, and knowledges many of which were formed outside 
of capitalism, in the public sector and in the interstices of commodified 
existence (Hardt  and Negri  258).  We can see a  resurgence of  ancient 
mystifications as the work of an increasingly cooperative and socialized 
power of living labor is presented as the completely magical power of 
capitalism to create wealth.210 A reading of these texts,  of  the fugitive 
thread  of  the  production  of  subjectivity  in  Marx,  also  exposes  the 
conditions for reversing these trends: it reveals that the stakes of opposing 
capital are not simply economic or political, but involve the production of 
subjectivity. In order to oppose capital it will be necessary to engage in a 
counter production of subjectivity. The tools for this counter-production 
are already in our hands, in the affective and communicative networks 
that are created and maintained in our day to day labors. 
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